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~~ictive trade  pE..!!.£,tices  and.  Common 
Market;  law 
~-·~~~·":1:.>~ 
(Text  of  a  statement  made  in London  on  April  14,  1972, 
q;{2Q_Q cJA,_, '\ 
ov  ~) 
by  Dr.  Willy Schlierler,  Director-General for  Competition, 
Commission of  the  European Economic  CollUY'.u.n:i.ties) 
Competition  policy plays  a  majo~ role  in realizing 
the  aims  of the  Common  Market,  The  opening  and  integration 
of the markets  gives  new  incentives to  firms  to  improve  their 
productivity  and  efficiency which will  in turnj_ncrease 
economic  and  technological  progress  in the  Commu.niijy. 
During the last ten years  the  exchange  of  goods  between 
Member  Stat.es  has  considerably  increased::  as  well  as  the 
"establishment of  su.bs3_diar ies  ove:r.  t.he  borders~  t.ransborder 
participation and  int.erna.tional  cooperation of  a.ll  kinds. 
For  the  consuwer,  thi~ development  means,  in general,  a 
larger  choice  and better supply of  goocls  and service8. 
The  CommissionYs  policy on  competition  j:!u.rsues  several 
aims,.  \':··  -:)  first is.  of  course~  to  m.aint.a:i.n  competition 
by  appJ.ying the  COmpetition  X'UlAS  "of  th:erre;rt:i  .. e:S~----y;;~-
80  far  it hos  the  :~f.I.-'H)  func-t:i.on  f.l.S  a  na-ljional  policy 
controlling restrictive  p:r.,qctices  o:r.  th~=;.  behaviour of  , 
enterprises  in a dominant-.  position.,  It.  aiw.s  to  ach.j_eve 
tJ•.r.;  opt~_nwm use  of  pr.odu.ction  f;t.c'l::.n.rs  1.o•hiJ.e  safeguarding 
the  :i_r:rtor.esi~.s  of ·the  cons.umer. 
Anoth8r  objecti~e  i~  related to  th~ taRk of creating 
one  Common  Marketo  The  Commis~>ion must  ensure that the 
abolition of  i~rade barriers  ar>.r:i  n.t,f.er  restJ.""ici~i.ons  between 
Member  S·tates  are  not  re~2_:~-~d. Ex..._e!:ivat£~.ad_e  b~?:.~i~· 
If the objectives of t,he  Community  are  i~o  be  realized., 
action must  be  taken  against  agreements  and  practices 
that threaten the  unity of the  Common  Market. .competition 
There  is  a  second  objective related  to  the  creation of  a 
Comm011  nrarl<et: ·  to  ensure  f  a  i  r  .. COI!!£etit_ion.  Open 
front~ers within the  ~ommunitv are  accePtable onlv  if all 
under•taidng.S  face  equal  conditions.  This  means  ~:xclu'ding 
legal  or  practic~l discrimination  in  the  form  of state 
monopolies  with  a  commercial  character,  and  preventing 
state aids  from  ciis·torting competition within the  Conmwn 
lvim·ket-,  .  . 
In  applying  Article  85;  the  Commission's  aim  is  not 
only  to  break  up  agreements  incompatible  with  the  Treaty 
but  also  to  grnnt  exemption  to  cooperation  agreements 
which  are  ccono'mically  sound.  In  pl'inciple all  agreements 
that  fall  under  the  general  ban  of  Article  85  par.  1  can  be 
exempted  if the specified conditions  are  fulfilled,  i,e. 
if the  agreement  contPibutcs to  the  improvement  of 
production or distribution or  to  the  promotion of technical 
or  economic 'proogPcss. 
In  many  cases 1  the  parties  concerned  voluntarily  agree  to 
put  ;Jn  end  to  r·est  r ict-.. i ve  t1PP c=mgcment~;  or  ·to  adapt  them  to 
the rules,  The  result  may  be  a  formal  decision of the 
Commission  granting  nn  exemption  under  Article  85  par.  3, 
(  11 negative  clear  ance 11  )  •  ,Or  ·the  case  may  simply  be  closed. 
The  Commission  has  full  discretion  - subject  only  to the 
control of the  Community's  Court  at  Luxembourg  - to  decide 
wh-at  pos ilion it will take. 
Guidance  from  case  Jaw 
Although  it is difficult to  generalize,  if individual 
decisions  t.--.ken  by 
11
'"  Comrn:is.-:;.ion  are  examined.  c~rtain 
guide-Lines  emerge, 
Horizontal  agreeme11Ls  beLween  prqducers  or dealers 
to  allocate markets,  customers  or  quobas  have  never  been 
exempted.  An  attempt  by  the  Gepman  steel  industry to 
obtain  a~thorization for  a  system of  quotas  failed  last 
year.  Price-fixing agreements  affecting tr·ade  betweeen 
Member  StaLes  have  also  hardly  ever  been  allowed.  In 
•':he  Qu ini.ne  case,  tlH?re  was  <tn  agreement  designed  primarily 
t.''  Of~~~·~:cGhome markets  1.,iLhJn  i;he  Community.  In  this 
case  the  Commission  lrnpnscd  C i ne.s  amounting  to  appt·ox imat.ely 
i)SOO.OOO,  Jn  the  ~~stur~~ casP  no  formal  price 
agreement.  was  proved  but  co ncet' led  practices  l'esul ted 
in  a1most  simull <~neous  price  intr''"ases.  Het'e  again 
the  p;u·ticipants  were  heavily  t'ined,  but  t.his  case  is 
und,~r·  appeal  of  IIH~  Coru·t. 
Also  forb {dden  ;n'f"  horizon  I  ;1 l  agl"'C('ments  between  firms 
of  only  one  lvlentiH·r·  State  if  UH'y  t'ix  prices  01'  the 
rond.itions  of  r·p<.:;;J lf'  of  impol't('cl  or  (~XpOt'ted  goods  (Dur~.-11 
c:enH·rJt  r radc r~  ass!wl;llln'i case :tnd  l)t~r,·h pnint nnd  v;Jrnish exp•)rt 
II s  f' ()I  I ell i  011  C:l s (' )  . - 3  . 
---- --=--- ::_.:_~_-_  -_- =---~~-,:"_.:_:-
Arrangt,ments protecting national markets by  way of collect:ive 
agreements est£)blishing.exclusive  T<:~Gtp roc  a 1-commercialrclations in 
one membt:r .state have also very iiulZ"cl~ of obtaining an Article 85, 
par.  3,  exemption (Belgian tiles manufactu:rers' and trader. s' associ at  ion case 
and the German tiles manufacturers' associ.ation case.  The second ai:,rreement 
concerned ~2~_ggreg-ateti rebate system). 
Exemptions 
Exemptions. are granted if the disa dvantnges that result from a  restrictive 
trade pracrice are counterbalanced by advantages to the general interest.  But 
in many cases the Commission has not accepted that such  counterbalancing 
advantages exist,  e. g.  in a  recent case concerning a  joint sale agency of 
German cement producers  which fixed prices and quotas in relation to exports 
to the Netherlands.  A kss strict line was adopted by the Commission with regard 
to joint sale agencies for fertilizers.  In  these cases the Commission issued 
negative clearances as the agreements did not concern exports to other member 
states.  The Commission's Directorate··general for competition is at present 
examining whether the joint sales in the home markets and in third countries 
result in a  de facto protection of  the respective home markets within the EEC. 
A negative clearance was also given to SAFCO,  an export association of 
French canned food producers which were small and practically unable to 
compete independently with bigger firms outside  their country. 
Especially for small and medium -sized firms cooperation is sometimes 
the best way to profit from all the opportunities the Common Market offers  . 
•  The Commission has therefore taken a number of steps to facilitate cooperation 
between enterprises  in cases where this is in the general interest. 
First,  it has published a  list of types of cooEeration which are not 
restrictive and therefore not prohibited under Article 85,  such as the joint 
use of certain facilities cx.mcerning stocks, . service or transport,  joint book-
keeping and market research,  joint advertising and cooperation of non-
competitors selling through a  joint sales agency. 
Second,  the Commission has made a  policy declaration according to which 
agreements do  not come under Article 85,  par.  1 if their economic importance 
is ncgli.gible.  This has been defined in terms of market share (not more than 5%) 
and aggregated annual turnover of all members of the cartel (not more than 
$15 million or $20 million where agreements among trading companies are 
concerned). 
Block c xemptions 
Based on the Commission's stand in the Grundiz-Consten  case,  regulation 
no.  67/67 exempts sole distributor agreements en bloc if the parties respect 
certain conditions and do  not provide for a total territorial protection of the 
sole distributor. The Commission"has recently received po\verfi·omthe Cound(to g-raht 
_  blo~k  exemptions fot· ocher types of agreements, e. g.  agr('ements on  specialization, 
agreements on -standards anCl the linl.iti:Hiori  ofproduction to certain types,  sizes 
._and qualities as well as agreements about· joi.nt research.  The draft regulation for 
block exemptions in some of these areas will be communicated to the member 
st~ites in the vety near future.  If the block exemptions come into force before 
entry,  the British Government will be consulted on the draft. 
With regard to vertical agreements between producers and dealers the 
Commission has accepted certain restrictions under Article 85,  par.  3,  and 
rejected others.'  1r{ ·the  Omega watch case ,  it accepted the restriction of sales 
to a  limited number of dealers only ,given the specific marketing conditions of 
Omega watches.  This will also be valid for restrictions on sales in comparable 
situations.  Diorect and indirect export prohibitions were disallowed in the 
Kodak case. 
Some recent developments 
' 
In  1971,  the Commission reached 19 anti -trust decisions,  considerably 
more than in any previous year.  The most interesting of these decisions are 
first those concerning the application of Article 85  to licence agreements in the 
field of commercial property rights and know-how and second those concerning 
the application of Article  ~6 to abuse of dominant positions in the market. 
The merging of different national markets into a  common market cannot 
be complete  unless technology is included.  This raises complicated issues. 
Patents,  trade marks and copyright 
In  the Parke-Davis  case  the Community Court ruled that a  Dutch patent 
holder for antibiotics could prevent imports into the Netherlands of such patented 
products from Italy, where they had been freely sold in the absence of  any 
patent protection of pharmaceuticals in that country.  The free importation of 
the patented antibiotics would have impaired'the essence of the Dutch patent. 
Nevertheless,  the Commission argued in this case that a national patent should 
not be invoked in  order to forbid the importation of a product which was put 
into circulation in one of the member states either by the patent-I10lder himself 
or with his consent. 
In  harmony with this view of the Commission,  the Court held,  in the land-
mark deci.sionof Deutsche Grammophon v.  Metro  of June 8,  1971,  that it is 
illegal to use a  copyright law of a  member state in order to prevent the marketing 
in that member state of phonograph records which were sold in another member 
state by the owner of the copyright or with hi.s  consent. 
The Co1..1rt  based this conclusion on Article 36  of the Treaty.  Article 36 
permits prohibitions or restrictions in  respect of imports,  exports or transit 
of goods which are jusnfied in order to protect industrial or commercial property. 
But such prohibitions shall not,  says Article 36,  "constitute either a means of 
nrbitrary discrimination or a  disguised restriction on trade between member states". ThE-~ COll.rt•sthtcdothattltc  oiJJ~~~hve of·:.runifieclcon1JnO!lil1~rket !;ould. 
not be achieveclif industJ?i<Jl  property nghts could l)c  invoked mc1~ety because 
they were still nat1onal in ciHn:acter.  As I see it.  by this decision the so" called 
, "telTitorial pnnciple" has been nbolishcd for all industrwl property rigllts 
ifthe product has been put inro circulation lmvfully and  tl1~~n:!  is no  Pnrke~Davis. 
situation.  Patents,  tn1clcmnrks and copyrights arc ccrwmly cllffercm m their 
origin nnd purpose.  TIJc:se differences ~nc of l111porrancc In  defining the subject 
matter of the different types of property rtghts winch are protected by  the 
Treaty.  But  these differences  al'c of no importance wllen we have to answer the 
,  question of whether  ~)1e national character of inclustri.al property rights is a 
reason to forbid th3 free circ''.tl.atwn of protected goods WJ.l.hin  a  common market. 
Since some authors question the appllcabillty of 1lle Deutsche Grammophon 
v.  Metro  ruling to patent law,  I  hope thor tbe Courr may soon have an 
opportunity to clarify the situ  at ion. 
Independently of the interprel<illOn of Article 36 by the European Court, 
the Commission wi.U  continue to apply Articlns 85 and 86 where enterprises 
through ag.t:eements,  concerted pr.actlccs or by  vi.rtue of a  domi.nant position 
use industrwl property r.i.ghts  jn order to maintmn the isolatwn of national 
markets and m  effect 1.0  p.rrvent the Common Market from operating.  The 
pnnciples developed in the Grundig case and m  i. lle Sirena ruhng of the Court, 
prohibiting the use of tra.de1;arkst:-; restnnn trade hetwe;n men:Jber states, 
have not become obsolete.  Tbw Jurispn:dencc is consist:ent Wlth  regulation 67/67 
which does not apply Jf  the parUes exercise patent: or trademark or similaJ~ rights 
in order to prevent dealers or consumers from buying protected products lawfully 
put into circulati.on in any part of the Community. 
~  In  1971  the Commissi.on took two dcci;nons Tdcrring to licence agreements 
known as the I3urrougl1R;C·eha  and Bu~~.onghs/Dct_p!angue . cases,  The li.cenP.?d 
product concerned is a  new carbon paper prodtJced in Italy,  France ancl Germany. 
Both licensees,  the French finn  Delplanqu~ anct the German f.1rm  Geha,  received 
non -exclusive prod,Jc.t:ion licenses for some patcn\.s and exclusive production 
licenses for orhen;.  There arc no terri.tori.al resr:rtc1:10ns on. <:des:  Li.c:ensox- . 
and. licensees sell the Hccnsed products  r;vc1~where jn the Common Market on a 
non -exclusive ba.si.s.  The market .share of the prn<}ltc:t amounts to about 10%  j.n 
France and Germany. 
In order to gi.ve guidelines to i.nclustry the Commission emphasized that in 
the caflc of a  non-cxclu~->i.vc palcnt: and know-how license the following cbl.i.g<Hi.ons 
shall. not be neat:ed as n:::strai.nt'R: 
1.  The oblipz:!:l£n  to grv.nl: no  ~~J].~!~·~nf>e~?-~?.!'~!C:pt  ~·5~-~rho_)Jy  dependent  compa:_!.::_<-:_~ 
The reason for thi.Fi  is  obvion~,: ()Illy  i.hc  owner of u p<l:ent nght can  R.uthor:.i;.;-::  thE~ 
exploitation of the patent  As .fa 1.'  as know-how  J';  C:\)D.Cr;!:;~·ncd,  thr~ secret can only 
be guaranteed .i.f  t.hc  knou.r-how  .1s  not·  cornmunic:atcct to i.hird partie~~ wi.thollt the 
conHent of 11.s  owner. 
2.  The oblJ._g<JJ~kr;ep the J~o,~l2_ow sc_t;!.:::!.  The Comm  i.t>sion  permits thi.s 
obUg1:1tion,  even for the time nfrer the agreemen:: h8.s  end~d, as a  pre-requiBit:c 
for commercializing know-how·. .. :3.  ·.  i~He o~liga~ti"on'i.b~iO§ecl··()h  .u1ci~·fit~nii&~rl'otro  Yt~e the·know•h()\v.after•the·· C]··.· 
termitiation: oCthe agreement.  This bas been accepted with some hesitation 
as it  is diBicult: iiot to use knowleclge.  But it  is one of the conditions of 
cornmercializing know-how in order to stimulate its communication. 
---- --
4.  The.~obllgation  to procluc:t-r the licensc:d products in sufflcient quantities anc.l 
--- .  -------
to follow the technical inRtrucuons of the licensor.  These are deemed to he 
necessary to  ollow  (·iantitattvely 8U.ffictent and technj cally unobjectionable use 
of the right granted to the patentee. 
5,  The  obligatio~ to mark the products fabncatcd under tl1e license so that t!wi r 
origin can be detected,  This has been accepted i.n  order to allow the licensor 
control of the quality and quantity of the products. 
6.  The obligation t:o  set.tle d}.sputes by arbitration. 
Another important statement in the Burrough~  decisions concerns the 
validity of .exclusive licenses.  The Commission belcl that an exclusive production 
license could he a  rentraint forbidden under Arti.cle 85  par.  l.  Exclusivity 
restricts the ability of a patentee to exploit the patent and thus Hmits the access 
of non -licensees to the nf!w technology, 
Future decisions will p)ve us further  clarHJc<~tion of the phi.losophy UlJder-
lying this statement and the possible impact on license agreements.  But we may 
already say this: the Commission rejects the idea of basing anti-trust 
•  considerations on the patentee's right to exclude.  Thjs right describes the legal 
position of the patentee and the Hcensees but cannot: be used as an argument: to 
jl}stify restrictions t.he  licensor wants to accept for hhm~elf. 
And a  second statement can he made:  the reservation of a  reasonable 
reward to the inventor is an important element in anti  .. trust considerations. 
If,  from an economic point of view, an _obligation is tndispensable in order 
to make a  licensing arrangement effective  ·and to assure the effectiveness of 
the patent concerned in accordance with the law on patents,  the Commission w1ll 
normally conclude that there J5 no  n~straint of trade.  Any  r.eflt.riction beyond 
that lim it may fall under Article 85,  par.  1, if 1t has an appreciable effect on 
competition and trade between rncmbe:r states. 
In  the Burro~h;  cases the Commission isr,ued negative clearances,  as 
there were no  apprc::ciable effects 011  competition  Jt.  reached thi.s conclusion 
consider~ng  thc=!  small maTk:et share of the part.kR to tbc agreement as well as 
t.he fact that licensor and licen:::;c-:es  sell the product (under different trademarks) 
everywllere 10 the Common Market:.  In  other caE;es exclusive production licenses 
may fall uncle r  Article 85,  par.  1,  f!S pecta  lly if t·he  pal. en  ted products acc01mt 
for a  high percentage of the relevant market. 
ISEC/B20/72  . .. /. _  ff  ,A~ftic  le~ 85,  liil  ;~;  J  appi.les,  the  fin~aLjn0gn:1t:!nJ o!l.tlJe va.lld).ty of 
any p::u:ttr.:uln r  rcsf·ricd.ve co,icnant will be tcs:·r-:0  ncconling- 1·o the Rtandn r.dR-
·:o-·t•  A;,.;t·1'<1,_,-8~  .  .,~.r ·  -:-~.  1''~---f·~·r··.:.it_q-1.J("''t. ,·on  J· ...  ,  .•  ,,,.'-"  c<''\'."'"'1-. ,,,.1'  •,=-.--
.t  .a..  _ (.:  ~  o,  t  l  \.L  _•  ,,  •  _~H.;- .-,  _\  . ,.n  _ --~  ·'-'---.  ..-.,  .,  .  ~\-:o-./'1  <  __ ,  l  {, L, 
001')~• the 1  ken:"e agreen1nnt (n0t  l:h~~  r:.'><.clttF~vity) in the par.t lcuJa,- cr~e 
ccn;i::·ff.;:tcto rhc  imprr.vcmcnl· 0J' the pxndnc.t:ion or distribution of goods C'J.'  1:0 
the p1:onwiion  of l:cehnicnl  01~ r-·conmnk  rii:ogrc··~~~  IY~"O!~,:rvillg- i'o t!1e  consurnm:~ 
on equit:;-lble :->klJ:c  o( UJ:-!  profit·? 
Jf t:hc nnswerl.:p  t.hU~ q1wstinn is  ''y(~!~" (t:hi;«  1•;~!]  noJ:i1ltllly  hr:  the caf<C) 
nmll;lw  np;,~r)~Jti\ent docs noL  elir.liro.;lt''  c.0ml''-'t:ir:ir.-n  /n~- n  r-:ni:1m."l.nt.ial  part o~ t:he 
p:1:oduc1:  market (clalJP.C  (b) Ari:icle  R!-5.  p;n·  3),  l:hn  nc~.,l:  rp•':f:l'ion 'viil he: 
An' i;he  rf:st:rictinns Hl l'hP.  ag.l~f~(~Plenl:  indit-:pct:H~-lbh:' 1:0  s·qcb  imp;~nvcllcnt:~~ or 
-tn ~uch p):onwtion  (cl~~.u.se (o.)  fif J\.r1~ic:1c  .?.S  p:1 r  3)? The  ·_n:\wr~r- 1~o l:hi.s 
qHCI'<tinn  wi.J:i  l:·e  the cn.1ci.al  tc~r-·t .for t:h::?.  c.xclui'd.vitv cl.a••:-::e.  ~.t  t:hc:r:r~ nr0  lr.':~~~ 
J:est.ric1:ive  w<tyf.  t:o  ('Xp.ioit the pAtert in  thr-::  \~Xi.~ti:1g cc•l·<rrc:u·::ivc  ~;·i::wti •.on, 
the Ani.ci'~ HS.  pnr.  :;  cxempt:i.'m wil.i.  not;  h0.  g.r::•.nl·(Y1 
Th;.s  concep1:  p('rnrii:r.;  r:!~.!2  .rr::conci.li<:l.h0n  0~'  n:r~  r:)·,.~_!<~rU.vr::c:  nf the p;;xc:nt 
ny,:;te\11  Ul'd cf nn::i··1Tu.st: cnfo,·cf'rn0n1:.  (U;  aprJ IC<t::ien P-:ny  )r-:ac~ !;o  t·he  rc,aJ]t 
that:  cYciu::;ivr~ pHll.ltlction.  lkt~nr.e~ can  moJ:r::  eat-.iJy bP.  ,inl; 1:i[icd U!2!1.  t:h~ 
exclnr;ivit:y cla11.sc  in  agrcemf~HtR !Hm.-ic!i.ng an nl).iigaU.<m  for.  the licc.,:;eP.  t·o 
li.cc-n::;c  fu~nrc parcmr•  o:t:"  krc•'~T· hew .in  fn,•our of (h~ ;!::8TJf-0r  ("grtn.t· back''> 
Thr::  Commi:-;~jor! will in the  w~ry near fw·''JC  .T".Hke  d~ci~ion~· nn  ~''iC·  <1'~!-Jc:-:­
hccn':e  cn.~~:s.  One concerns  agJe(~Dlcnt~ hct:\"CC!l.  q~,r 'J  S.  i"i_;  .. ;p f),;vi-;:!:':nn  H.l'H  ... r:r-
a.nrl  Con:nnon  :vra rkct  li.ct:n~:ccs; ·t·hc  nt~1e1:,  an  ~~m~<x:•nent be'.:w.sen  a  Frc.nch 
!1.cen:-:oc nnd ::he  .l~,prtnt''·~·c  ~Tagoya Rt1bhe r.  Co.  7hsFf: clP.c:u: ionb wii!,  m110n.~ 
oJ:hcJ~ pn,bi.-2nw,  cover a  "_gran!:· back" obltgati.m~. a.nd art  expo,:t.  J~et.;t;ri,;ticr. 
i.mp0~cd Oil  a  .;a.p::J.Ilt~S'C!  li.ccr.H'C. 
. 
T  l ::)"' 1  h  ~  .  .  I,  I  f  .  .,  •  •  "  ...  ,  1.11  "I  .•.  t  c  \.Jom.iTI1S:5JOn 1:0•)'\. t  :.f;  _'1_1:,-·i.  ;.;V:p~' t:c·  ·:'l.pp  y  .i~:C'1.:1ClC  l~b.  l. olC  \'WI) 
CP.d.~;imw :.~c:m.er::nv~c:l \''Cl.'f:  r~•.theT c::.if:f>':rc:at  i.n  nn.::n:n;·  ,  ... 1-l,~  cp;.,tt..  rJ,~~:i.;:i.r,n 
U IHE:t:rrme v;)wt. kind of concl.uci:  may br::  iudp,!·)d 1:n  b~ :Jn  ''c>·h~·~~~·,;·;-;-0.f  <1.  dm"'iP:.'.nf: 
por;i.tlnn.  The  Q:•lltilJ.I;~_!:!!;<~~.S'::?F:.  C<JfiC  •:.leD.lt;  wit:h tbr.  C'.pp''.i.c,;~.t'ic:n  or  1\'.ti·:-k P0. 
t:o  mcJ:w~··::-:. 
As Y•::'lll  krcw.  ArU.,Je  ~,(:.  <i~c·:D.•:f;:-'  i.lk:p-at  i:b.~:  ai~'J.•<· ni:'  :::•.  donti.r•·"''ll: pn  .. :.;J,.r·n 
Wil:hi:.7  l:hr::  Co.rnmo•:~  M<lJ:J.:-~t or wj1hi.n H  :':f.l:!f-!t.=mtle.l  ~1n::·t  c.:::  .i1:. 
---.----~···-........ _ 
·.:~he  GRivlA,  :J  G8J.'Tl:~ar  •.  c;ntT;p;1.ny  t:c:ro1:•:.:·.o:.n::iil.l'  :lP~.h·:.-r; qf FotJ~:'.:.  jn o;:,·ir::::: 
tt'.,  ~y·,1.iOJ.t  •:ht.~i.J:  copyx·i.r{1J1:F;,  nr~cnpir.c; ·"·  Co-qi•·,CJr'·l:•-.:·.''J.:m  i(•  ..  -~-=::•:ll:.<•ny  ~c~~ ).:·  '1-1~· 
no cn'llre•:it:o.r-H  Th.: d::>dr:;i.nn ;ncnt.i.nncd R  niPr..J.:-~;: of:  pi ,,_.._;ep,  .·.::z,ch::·r::d :-.v  ~!.F 1•tiA 
vi~  ··h. -v'  .-·~  i:he  own  en:~ of tlw copy.d.ght,  thc.ix O'VP.  ·,-qr:~·n!).::;~H,  l:h?.  r.oii :·o:c;;  oi  :lln.s  i.e, 
the p 1~0ihv;en·> o·i'  recorc:lG  and thr::  tmpcnc'!n; of .rcc(lrr'r. (;l.!'r!.  :;~_,,mrt-n=·_,:o<{::;ig 
eqni.pn1r-n·c  into Gexnwn.y. - ~  - -
··  Althoug1i. complicated,  tllt! GEtviA decision is cconomtcrilly artdeveti · ~ 
soCially  ith irnpoitnnt ohe.  With i~cgarci to Ow1iers ofcopy1"1ghts.  the·· 
ComtnissiOIL found that  then~ was discrirninnt ion against cinzens and companies 
of other member states.  Poreigri edttors nnd Germ:m editors depending on 
foreign companie3were,  for example,  not <idmittcd to otdmnry nwmbership. 
Furtherfnore,  the charn~t of the associntian tied up members in  such a 
way thnt they could not ir1  practice authorize other compamcs to exploit their 
rights.  GEMA paid a premium for membend1ip fidelity and did not allow 
splitting up the copyrights according to the  ~ield of use but demanded a total 
transfer of copyright  .. , The Commisswn 
1
8  decJsion enutled the copy  right 
owners to authorize different companies to exploit different categories of 
the  rights,  i.e.  radio stations, editors,  f1lm  or record producers. 
The statutory 20-year period before a  composer of music could hope to 
get payments out of the pension fund was reduced to five years,  the obligation 
to go to arbitration was outlawed and the vesting of penswn rights was upheld 
in cases of cancellation of membership.  GEMA is also no longer entitled to 
collect mooey for parts of records which do not mvolve copyrights and for 
records imported or re-imported to Germany by dealers, if copyright fees 
have already been paid for such records in Germany or elsewhere in the  EEC. 
The Commission will have to take similar decisions this year with 
regard to other associations like GEMA in  other member states.  GEMA 
originally appealed against the Comn11ssion 
1
S  decision but the appeal has 
been withdrawn. 
The Continental Can case 
Special attention to the competition policy of the Commission has been 
drawn by the Continental Can decision.  The Commiss10n held that Continental 
Can 's acquisition of a  Dutch competitor constituted an abuse of a  dominant 
position. 
I 
In  1966 the Commi.ssion in a  memoran'cium on the problem of concentration 
already expressed tl'B  opinion that <m  attempt to monopolize a  market could be 
an abuse in the sense of Artic.le 86.  lt refused to limJt Article 86 only to cases 
of market behaviour. 
Not that mergers as such are criticized,  but rather the elimination of actual 
or potential competition through mergers wnh competitors.  The acquiSJtion by 
an enterprise m  a  dominant posjtion of a  competitor  I  resu1tmg in further 
reducing competition,  may have exactly the same adverse effects as the examples 
of abusive behaviour dcscnbecl in clause (b) of Art1cle 86 (the linntation of 
production markets or techmcal developments to the prejudice of consumers). 
As it can hardly be denied that the freedom of choice to the consumer is 
essential for competition,  the eliminatLOn of this ch01ce as well as its further 
reduction by a  dominating enterprise can preJudice the mtere5ts of consumers. 
There is no economic or other reason to limit Article 86 to market behavi.our. 
The examples set forth in clause (b) of Article 86 show this clearly. - - - -- "'  -_-
' ·····  ... ··  .•..  ·.··•···•·· FurJ.itermq}:<!j. the  r.lpplicaJ:lQn.o(Atti~le·86 ·does not  depend on 'i finding 
··  t1i;it "ihc\forn ina  HI r>ositfon  hn&'bbcn  ti~cd \.Oniiy  \\ray  \\rha1·cvc~ to a chleve the 
di.sap~1rovcct result,  ft 1s sufficient H a rcHult incornpo.tible with the purposes 
.  ··.·.  ·of  thl~ Rorbc Trenty is c!Uc to an action nf a.n  cnt6J'prisc inn dominant position. 
·.·  Thr~ CornmisHlon ;H  ctecJFilOl1  define~ the rkmunant position of Continental 
· Carr with regard t;o  n g1.ven product a1nrket anri a  given.  gt'!0gr.aph!cal area, 
although Article 86 docs n.ot spedhcnlly rcqitin] such definition.  It is of 
inter0.st to note that the Commission's findi.ng docs not concern the enti.rc 
packnging nw rket but only the product m;ukeu:; for pnckagi.ng n1ent and Hsh 
and certain metal.closures for gJHss jars. 
According to the Comrni.ssi.on,  enterprises UW! m  a  dominant position 
when their Rcope for independent behavionr is such that they c:.1n  tnke their 
dccisi.ons without paying substantial attention t0 competitors,  buyen; or 
suppliers.  This may occur H ejthcr their shan~ of thr::  market or the)r m:=u:ket 
share coupled with theu teclmi.cal knowledge,  raw materials or capital, 
enables them to determine prices or to ;:ontrol p:roducrJ.on or cli.stri.buti.on 
in a  substantial part of the market. 
The gontinental Can  deci.sjon,  whi.ch asked the company to submit 
divestiture plans before July 1 of this year, is a  landma:rk in the history of 
EEC anti· tmst enforcement 
When Br:i.~ain JOins 
Let me add a  few  w0rd~ CJbout.  what happr;n~ once: Britain t=:ntcrs  the 
Common Market; 
The Accession T: ~a.Ues r.tipul.<Jt8  that. 1:he  c(•mpetit1'1n :rules l2.i.d  riown 
in the ECSC and ERC TrenUr s.  a:-;  well af,;  thei.:r.  n:nplement:ing regulations, 
wHl he applicable to the cnlargecl. Commnnit:y by  Jrl.nuar'i  1, .1973 1:0  a.J.l 
rf.!stncl:ivc pract.i.ccs falUng undr;r t.hr~t-:c  ruk~s by ;:he  fac1~ of thP.  CJ.ccr.sf'i.on. 
TranBit.i.onal 8JTr1ngcment::> w11t.  howcvr~1:,  c.:ovcr.  ~imr:tt'on~ a·lrca.dy 
exi.st.ing on  that: date and which hecomc by tl1e  oct of acc~sHion incompatible 
with CommHnity rn]cf). 
Agreements,  cleci.shms and  conc•~.tted prac;ttco~ h~l.wcr:n UJ:l.c.lcri:al<;~ng< 
concluded nfi·cr Jan11a:ry  l,  1973 1.0 whkh ;\ rticl0 SS  EEC Trc;.tJy or Ani  c)£)  6G 
ECSC Treat:y a.re npplJc<JbJe 'Vill Jw vc  1\)  be n.ot.1hc::d  r-a  i.hr.;  Con."1mt::;&i0n  i.1 
conformity wtt.h thr-!  xngulntionf;  cxisti.n~ in tile Cornmnn iv1arkct  Fo:c those 
that are in exifitenr.:e on .Tanuc:ny  l,  197.1.  a  t.ranr~itional rli"'pasl1J0'1  :ny.c·:  down 
that they  mu~t: be no!:i.ficcl by ]nly l,  .1973,  if i:hc.y  fnl!  tmck~:r Anich w;,  and 
by Apri.J.  l,  l97~i,  i.fthey fa.llunrk:r Articlc r:s. 
Artic.]cs R6  anrl 66,  as w0H <li.·  the  i':np'lcmentin~ dccisi.onR t0 
Article 66 will h0.  appJJ.c:1hl•~ t.o  :roerg-e:r:~  an~lthc ab•J.E'"'·  o·f·  il.  dommant: 
posiU.o11  8S  from Jarwaxy 1,  1973; thi.G  means t·hat.  l~;:.;rsc;aJJy with  n~grr rrl 
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~totlw field covered by tlie  ECSC Treaty all operations that result directly 
or~ indirectly  Within the enlarged Con:, munity in-an industrial conc.entration 
between undertakings,  one of which nt least falls under Article 80 of the-
ECSC  Treaty,~ wiH have to ask  for prior authorization by the Commission. 
Artie le 86 does not,  on the other hand,  by the provisions that are 
now  in force,  demand any prior notification of mergers. 
With  rega~d t.q,goods that fall under the ECSC Treaty,  it must be 
borne in mind that in application of Article 60  of this Treaty undertakings 
must pubiish the price lists and sales conditions they use in the Common 
Market.  This provision will come into force by January 1.  1973. 
To conClude this summary I should like to stress that competition 
policy  has become an important feature of EEC policy and that its role 
is likely to continue undiminished after the enlargement of the Community. 
I am convtnced that a  good poHcy of this kind serves the interests of 
industry and commerce as well as the interests of consumers. 
ISEC/B20/72 